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The political discourse of exclusion and the making of social policies in India are 
conventionally centered on the issue of caste, and have lately extended to 
religious identities.  I have dealt with the issue of religious identities elsewhere. 
(mahajan-Jodhka) Here I shall focus on the established academic and political 
practice of problematizing exclusion in terms of caste. My larger objective, 
however, is to critically examine the prevailing theoretical perspective on caste 
and, in the process, reformulate some propositions on caste from the perspective 
of political theory. This, I hope, will enable a more direct and precise 
understanding of contemporary structures of social exclusion in today’s India. 
Before I proceed further, I wish to flag three theoretically interrelated 
points/issues which I shall elaborate with a view to developing a political-
theoretical perspective on caste. First, while many forms of exclusion are 
structurally integral to caste there also are, and have always been there, those 
unrelated to the hierarchical caste, as well as the ones representing combination 
of the caste and non-caste elements. Second in making a social policy for 
combating exclusion it is crucial to take account of the historically changed 
political–cultural context of social exclusion, i.e modernity, nation–state, 
democracy and now globalization. Third,  such profound ideological and 
structural changes have occurred in the caste system especially after 
independence, that it is theoretically inappropriate to describe India’s 
stratificatory system primarily in caste terms. My overall argument is that 
predominance of the ritual–hierarchical theory of caste has prevented policies 
from taking cognizance of new forms of exclusion even as the theory continue to 
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obfuscate the terms of discourse on older forms of exclusion, such as 
untouchability and social backwardness.  
 
I 
The Theory–Policy nexus 
Two distinct, but mutually complimentary social-anthropological theories have 
shaped the perspective on caste that has dominated not only the theoretical and 
empirical research on caste, but the policy discourse and even common sense 
about social exclusion.  These theories have grown out of two major structuralist 
traditions: one founded by the French social anthropologist Levis-Strauss and the 
other by the British social anthropologist Redcliff Brown. The Levis-Straussian 
structuralism is stretched and adapted by Luis Dumont and the Redclif-Brownian 
structural-functionalism is empirically opened up and enhanced by M.N. Srinivas, 
respectively  in their studies of Indian caste.  I am aware of the sharp internal 
differences between the exponents of these two structuralist schools, but they  
together have, in my view, contributed to a certain common understanding of 
caste; i.e, viewing caste as an ideological structure and a social system that 
continually arranges and re-arranges statuses in vertical hierarchies according to 
its internal,  binary principle of  ritual purity versus impurity—purity being 
epitomized in the topmost status in the hierarchy, (the brahman), and the impurity 
being densely concentrated in the bottom most status, (the untouchable).  
Between these two ideological/structural poles which define the caste hierarchy, 
statuses of groups within the hierarchy may vary, overlap or even change over 
time and across spaces in the degree of purity or impurity they represent.  But 
the overall structure and the rituality principle dispensing statuses to groups is 
invariant. It is this principle that has engendered  a more or less  permanent and  
holistic structural character to caste.   
 3 
This view of caste did not remain confined to the academic discourse.  It found its 
way—through the expert advice of leading sociologists (the list among others 
included Professor M.N.Srinivas) to the Mandal Commission—In the policy 
discourse which privileged ritual status of a caste as the main criterion for 
determining its social and educational backwardness.  
It is only recently that caste is being seen as a hierarchically patterned system of 
substantially existing communities which  struggle and horizontally compete for 
resources--social, cultural, political and economic--on the ground; in the process, 
routinely flaunting the rules of rituality and wresting themselves loose and away 
from the straitjacket of ritual hierarchy.  The social policy, however, continue to 
remain in the grip of the conventional structuralist theories and identifies victims 
of social exclusion in terms of their traditional, ritually ascribed disabilities. As 
such,  benefits of the policy remain by and large confined to members of certain 
involuntary, hereditary groups located at the bottom of the traditional hierarchy 
i.e., (the lower sudras) as well as those defined out of the sacred ideological 
frame of social hierarchy; ie., the outcaste and the aboriginal groups.  
Consequently, exclusions based on gender discrimination, endemic poverty, 
cultural marginalization of religious, linguistic and racial minorities, regional 
backwardness, old age and physical disability have been inadequately 
addressed.  Also, exclusions experienced by individuals, households and 
localities on dimensions not accounted by existing social justice policies, such as 
vastly unequal patterns of income distribution, spatial divisions and  segregations 
in housing (e.g. slumming and communal ghettoization) especially in towns and 
cities, unequal access to education and the school system and to health and the 
hospital  services do not constitute among core concerns for social policy-making 
and theorizing social justice. 
Worse, the predominance of ritual-status theory of caste has blinded scholars, as 
well as policy makers, to the emergence of new ‘untouchables’—the 
untouchables of Development--the people whom the market model of (capitalist) 
development has not, and will perhaps never touch.  This is the left-out, under-
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class of Development.  Admittedly, this underclass comprises largely of the ex-
untouchables and the tribals (the SCs and the STs) but it also includes numerous 
occupational groups whose skills and crafts have been rendered defunct by 
development and are pushed in a perpetual state of penury.  Also, the ritual 
status criterion fails to take account of the growing phenomenon of downward 
social mobility of significant numbers of the so called upper caste households 
joining ranks of the working class (Ref. CSDS Surveys). In short, problematizing 
exclusion purely in ritual status terms has prevented theorization of social justice 
from accounting a wide range of social facts contributing to creating conditions of 
injustice in the society.  
Thus, even though it is empirically true that the non-caste type of social exclusion 
is experienced widely by those belonging to the lowest rungs of the traditional 
hierarchy, it does not constitute a sufficient ground to justify the argument—often 
made in the discourse of social justice in India—that all contemporary forms of 
exclusion are symptomatic of the caste system, constructed by the theory as an 
undimensional hierarchy of ritual statuses.  Inequalities and exclusions arising 
from contemporary forces of modernism, nationalism, developmentalism and 
Globalism remain by and large unrecognized. 
This is not to deny that certain social groups have been systemically deprived 
and discriminated on account of their traditional ritual status, and that 
Reservations for them is justified.  But the terms of justifications used in defense 
of the policy are often unjustifiable.  First, recognition of a ritual status group as a 
permanent policy category for dispensing or withholding development and 
welfare benefits totalizes a community which in reality has been an internally 
highly differentiated, and an amorphous social-political formation. Such 
recognition lends a tradition-like perianiality to the policy.  In fact every smaller 
and specific ritual-status group of the caste hierarchy today is internally divided 
along the economic, educational, social and even cultural dimensions.  The result 
is that while some sections of a traditionally lower ritual status group may 
continue to experience exclusion, others of the same group no longer do.  Such 
 5 
differentiations are usually ignored in the social-justice discourse and in policy 
making.    
Non-recognition of internal, structural divisions within a caste group is one reason 
why no forceful argument has emerged for exiting from reservations those sub-
groups and households of a caste which may have ceased to be backward. It 
should be remembered that low ritual status is not in itself a criterion for 
identifying a beneficiary group. In principle the reservation policy recognizes a 
social group for benefits not because of its low ritual status per se, but because 
of strong historical association of the low ritual status with social deprivation and 
disprivilege which have resulted in its contemporary condition of social, economic 
and educational backwardness. Once the association (correlation) between the 
ritual status and social deprivation (and backwardness) empirically ceases, 
rituality must lose its relevance for the policy.   
Second, a ‘high’ ritual status group has ceased to be a relevant consideration for 
receiving any institutional advantage.  Today, the advantage of belonging to a 
‘high’ ritual status group accrue, as it may to any caste group through forming 
nepotistic networks or may lie in cultivating self-appeasing private thoughts about 
one’s ritual status. With rituality getting detached from social status, ritual status 
has become a rapidly disintegrating social category.  But the policy continues to 
treat it as a durable, even a permanent category.   
Third, Reservations plug but one source of social discrimination and exclusion in 
contemporary India.  As such it has considerably restricted the erstwhile upper 
castes from using their historically accumulated status resources to prevent 
those at the lower rungs from accessing modern and democratic means of 
upward social mobility.  Democratic politics accompanied by Reservations have 
indeed thwarted such negative developments. In this sense Reservations should 
be seen as a policy not about privileging one set of ritual statuses and 
disprevileging the other.  It is a policy meant to address the issue of acute social-
inequalities created by accumulated social and economic capital of the erstwhile 
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higher-status groups and severe capital deficit and resource-lessness of the 
lower-status groups of the old hierarchy. In fact it is, and must be seen as a 
secular policy for removal of backwardness of groups belonging to different 
castes as well as religious communities. 
Thus the theory by viewing ritual hierarchical caste as the governing principle of 
the  contemporary stratificatory system, and the policy by privileging, in practice, 
the ritual status of a caste for dispensing social justice have resulted in 
disempowerment of individuals qua citizens. Such systemic privileging of 
collectivities has led to unacceptable degree of tolerance by democratic 
institutions of violation of rights and dignity of individual citizens. To put it more 
concretely  problematising social inequality and exclusion primarily in collectivist, 
ritual-status terms may altogether exclude from democratic discourse and politics 
those citizens and households lying at the bottom of the pile in the new, post-
caste stratificatory system, but have not inherited matching ritual statuses 
recognized by the policy.  (For example 50 per cent population below the poverty 
line (BPL,) do not belong to SC, ST categories) 
 
II 
Critiquing structuralist theory, especially after Professor M.N. Srinivas himself 
pronounced death of the caste system and wrote its obituary in 1999 (few 
months before his sad demise), may appear like beating a dead horse. But 
considering the fact that (i)India’s social policies still remain embedded in  the 
principle of ritual hierarchy and (ii) that the terms of justification to claims of the 
upwardly mobile castes for the new democratic power and privileges continue to 
make sense to our policy markers, even for those communities which have 
ceased to be socially backward and have rendered for themselves ritual 
disabilities irrelevant for upward mobility, it seem, the dead horse is kicking hard! 
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The point however is not of holding an inquest on the death of caste! In fact, in 
the eyes of many a sociologist, not devoted to Redclif-Browinian structural-
functionalism or the Dumontian ideological model of caste, the ideological and 
structural moorings of the ritual hierarchy greatly loosened in the decades 
following India’s Independence—thanks to profound economic and political 
changes in the larger society (I.P. etal). These strands of research, however, 
were kept  at the periphery by the then dominant structuralist discourse on caste. 
The issue really is about the prolonged non-recognition by the sociologists of the 
kind of transformations the caste system was undergoing and their implications 
for legitimizing the policies and the terms of political discourse concerning the 
issue of caste, and generally about the nature of social change in the post-
Independent India.  
To put differently, a much larger issue is involved: It is about freeing sociological 
imagination, and the method, from viewing social stratification in India, as a 
totally integrated, self-perpetuating synchronical whole which effects changes, on 
its own, within itself so that it can basically remain the same,—i.e. by changing 
shapes and functions of its elements, but retaining its intrinsic ideological and 
systemic character.  
In what follows I shall briefly explicate three aspects of this theoretical 
perspective which, in my view, have, in their different ways stunted sociological 
research on stratification in India—by preventing (a) generation of new data, (b) 
refinement of analytical tools and procedures for studying contemporary 
formations and processes of social stratification in India.  
1 Sacral and power neutral conception of Social stratification (exclusion).  
The structuralist theories do indeed account for the role economic and political 
power play in functioning of the ritual status system of caste. However, 
acquisition of such power by a lower ritual-status group, does not entitle it to a 
higher status in the social hierarchy. For example, for Dumont such (secular) 
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power is subsumed, subordinated and encompassed by the rituality principle. 
M.N. Srinivas however, recognizes acquisition of such power by lower castes as 
an important empirical phenomenon arisen (or accompanied by) modernity and 
democracy. In his view castes by acquiring such new power expand horizontal 
spaces for their social functioning—they even attain social dominance. But 
dominance does not qualify them to a higher status. To put it differently, 
theoretically, power earns status to a group only when its power is sacralized. 
Ritually unsanctified  power is anomalous and lacks systemic legitimacy. The 
powerful, but ritually lower castes can of course earn ritual respect through 
sankritization, but not the actual status. Ofcourse, eventually, their power, in 
some cases, may even be legitimized by the system’s sanctifying authorities. 
Such groups then may get admitted to a dvija category. Ironically the structuralist 
view of flexibility/mobility of the caste system resonates, in some strange ways, 
with the ideology and structure of the varana-jati system delineated in the 
scriptures (the dharma sastras),  especially with the ideas pertaining to jati-
utkarsh (upward mobility) and jati apkarsh (downward mobility) where 
transgressions of ritual codes lead to downward mobility and compliance to 
upward mobility. 
Interestingly, the structuralists began to admit, sometime in the late 1980’s, that 
ritual status had ceased to be an important consideration in determination of 
social status of groups and individuals. Such recognition however came not 
because new data had come to light. It, infact, came through politics—the politics 
of opposing implementation of the Mandal Commission Report. However, the 
modification of the theory itself,--I.e., acknowledging implosion of the ritual- 
hierarchy and relating it to the economic and political changes which took place 
in the post-Independent India--took a long time, over three decades. (Future of 
caste essay) 
To conclude, the theory persisted with the sacral and power neutral view of social 
stratification in the face of rapid disintegration of the ideological and systemic 
bases of the caste-system. This, in effect stalled for long time theoretical and 
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empirical explorations in the Indian sociological research of relationships 
between principles and processes of social stratification and the economic and 
political changes in the society. 
Orientation to history 
The structuralist view of caste as a perpetually synchronic and vertically-
integrated system of hierarchy, informed and legitimated by a sense of religious 
morality ‘(values)’ had little use for history. 
It should therefore not surprise us that no significant attempt has been made to 
historically reconstruct (historicize) the institution of caste in India—i.e. 
producing, for example, the kind of accounts we have for slavery or the making of 
the working class. In short , history only rarely enters the structuralist theorization 
of castes.  
The only exception has been B.R. Ambedkar who used historical sources to 
study caste and used that understanding  effectively in his struggles against 
oppressions and humiliation inflicted in the ritual power hierarchy on those 
pushed and kept on the periphery of the ritual order. But Ambedkar despite his 
use of history for unraveling sociological issues of his time, he did not qualify 
himself to be admitted either to the caste of Historians or of the Sociologists. 
For Indian sociologists either Sanskritic scriptural texts or the informant-oriented 
fieldwork (where informants were by and large the caste Hindus) constituted 
main sources for theorizing caste.  The result was, the theory even if 
inadvertently, represented an ideological view of caste similar to the one 
propounded in the sanskritic scriptures, and developed, defended and legitimized 
by the custodians of these scriptures over centuries.  It is a known tendency that 
ideology abhors history and when required it creates its own history-
retrospectively.  One may indeed find an odd structural theorist of caste 
approaching history from such perspective.  Usually the idea of using history is to 
illustrate the structural continuities in caste. (Shah)There indeed are some 
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creditable efforts of some historians who have made us available historical  tracts 
from the Buddhist, Jain, Charvak and Tantric literature, but these hardly ever 
entered the account of caste in the sociological literature.  (D. Chattopadhya, 
R.S. Sharma, Uma Chakravarti) 
If we take these sources into account caste will begin to look quite different from 
the established ideological view we are used to.  For example when we visit 
Buddhist and Jain historical sources we do not get a sense of a varna system.  
There ofcourse are the Brahamans, kshatriyas and householders but the 
relationships are not depicted in terms of ritual hierarchy.  The picture that 
emerges is more of guilds and communities. On the whole, if we take a historical 
view of caste, based both on taking into account the non-Brahmanic sources, 
caste would appear as a plurality of socio-political collectivities who continually 
struggled, strived, and competed for acquiring higher statuses in the society, 
even as they sought to maintain their different cultural identities.   
The fact is that caste has been a politically and ideologically contested terrain 
from its inception in which hegemonic ideologies continued to be crafted and 
sought to be institutionalized by certain dominant social groups or communities 
ensuring for themselves higher social-ritual status.  Such dominance, achieved 
by establishing a near monopoly of power and knowledge in the society has been 
constantly, resisted by the subjugated communities.  Quite a few of these 
communities periodically, forcefully challenged the upper-caste dominance by 
producing counter-ideological discourses and often even forming political 
alliances among themselves.  By mobilizing military support of their compatriots, 
leaders of such communities even managed to acquire power in form of kingship 
or generally by establishing membership to the ‘class of rulers’ 
(rajanyas/kshatriyas) In such moments of history when the hierarchies were 
shaken loose the lower-status, subjugated groups succeeded in moving upward 
in the ritual hierarchy demonstrating, in the process, the salience of the power-
principle of caste over the status-principle. 
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To conclude, the ahistorical, strurcturalist view of caste is, ironically, marked by a 
kind of noncontemporariety which has blinded the theory to the newly emerged 




The structuralist imperviousness to history has distorted the sociological 
understanding of untouchability as an abstract idea, a perpetual structural 
necessity to understand its opposite, the idea of purity. The untouchables and 
their problems did not constitute a legitimate area of sociological inquiry. It was 
seen as a social (not sociological) problem, best left to social-workers and 
politicians. At best, it was seen as a consequence of functioning of the system’s 
principle of purity and pollution, continually causing ritual distances among its 
members. If one insists that the theorists must look at untouchables as a people, 
i.e., beyond their preoccupation with the abstract principle (invoking Ambedkar’s 
division of labour vs. laborers) the response at best could be to view them as 
victims of collateral damage—unitended consequence of the system’s efforts to 
retain its structural integrity and ideological values. 
Strangely, it seems, the scholars were not prepared to fully work out implications 
of the purity-pollution principle when it came to explaining untouchability. In what 
follows I shall briefly elaborate these implication which, in my view have not been 
explored by the theory. 
 It is undeniable that untouchability is integral to Hindu ritual practices. It defines 
physical distances among individuals and groups in terms of purity and pollution. 
Such distances were indeed observed even within a family, between husband 
and wife and even between mother and child, for example, in the case of a 
menstruating woman. Some scholars mistakenly see such a practice of 
temporary and contextual ‘untouchability’ as comparable and qualitatively similar 
 12 
to the practice of caste Hindus treating the entire group of people as 
untouchables for centuries. 
In the case of untouchability of an untouchable caste, it is a permanently fixed 
attribute that is meant to be inherited from generation to generation. This 
untouchability has little to do with the physical cleanliness or uncleanliness of the 
so-called ‘untouchability has little to do with the physical cleanliness or 
uncleanliness of so-called ‘untouchables’. In their case, untouchability is treated 
as inhering in the bodies of untouchables. It is not the work they do which is 
defiling but what an untouchable did, became defiling. Whatever object he/she  
touched or on which cast a shadow of his body was considered and treated as 
untouchable. In this sense untocubabiliy has been an extreme form of rituality 
[]ritual practice]. Traditionally the arena of ritual practice was considered sacred 
and observance of ritual purity as endowing the practitioners with magical 
powers, and with pure bodies. Rituality, thus constituted its own sacred sphere 
and that space was monopolized, in different degrees, by the communities of 
dwijas (the Brahmans, the Kshitriyas and the Vaishyas) who were supposed, 
literally, to embody purity! 
It seems that historically it was when observing ritual purity began to be 
associated with gaining of magical powers by its practitioners (roughly, the period 
of epistemic predominance of the Mimansakas and Smritikaras) that the 
exclusion of the non-dwijas became institutionalized. (Ambedkar’s: counter 
Revolution) Observing ritual purity and, consequently, untouchability acquired 
even a ‘moral’ justification a behavior that earned merit. Those among the 
sudras, considered the ‘inassimilable’ vanquished, e.g. the chandals of the 
ancient times, began to be despised, and treated as the outcaste and 
untouchable. Since then the numbers of ‘untouchable’ castes began to proliferate 
with the growing obsession of the dwijas with ritual purity. This resulted in 
attaching impurity to an increasing number of economic—productive and 
service—activities and occupations and their practitioners treated as ‘polluting’ in 
their persons. Several groups of people and individuals were not admitted into 
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(e.g. the chandals for resisting subjugation.) or were pushed out (e.g. groups of 
people who ate dog meat or skinned dead animals) of the caste system as a 
punishment for intransigence as well as for deviance and transgressions 
considered serious, and violative of the basic ritual codes of caste organization. 
In the creation of untouchability, the dimension of rituality was, thus, interwinded 
with that of power. 
Thus seen Ambedkar was right to associate untouchability with the caste system. 
The point I wish to make in today’s context is that the ritual aspect of caste 
having been extremely weakened, almost defunct, the practice of untouchability, 
which we witness today, has lost its traditional-ritual legitimation. It is used as an 
instrument of the powerful to subjugate the powerless. The conflict and violence 
we witness today on the issue of untouchability make greater theoretical sense 
when seen in terms of changing relations of power, than as reinforcement or 
assertion of any ritual practice associated with untouchability. The dominant 
castes often use ‘untouchability’ as a means to subjugate, even humiliate, the 
dalits, on the other hand, having recovered their self-respect and achieved a 
degree of well being thanks to the rights movements and the policies like 
reservation, resist and protest against the upper caste dominance. On the whole 
atrocities are committed on dalits by the upper castes particularly by those 
among them who have either acutely felt the loss of traditional social power or 
the castes who have been able to establish their dominance in villages, using 
their increased economic power and the political power of numbers./ All said, 
however, as far as dalits are concerned it cannot be denied that some elements 
of rituality still survive in their relation to the savarna castes. Among the non-dalit 





The New Stratificatory System 
The structure of stratification that has emerged in India, especially after independence, is 
in many ways quite different. The new stratificatory system has acquired a pan-Indian 
macro structure, which is radically different from the local ritual-hierarchy based caste 
structure. The macro structure of caste, if it had one, was more like a theoretical 
reference, a conceptual scheme used for identifying the mobile and migrant communities 
of different castes in general terms of ritual status, so that some sense could be made of 
their place in the new local hierarchy they enter as migrants. This was the scheme of 
varna categories. Whereas the stratificatoy system that has emerged after Independence 
has acquired a structural character at the national-society level. This is, firstly because 
the social policies of the Indian state have institutionalized new, nationally relevant 
demographic categories: the Scheduled Castes (SC) the Scheduled Tribes (ST) and the 
Other Backward Classes (OBC). These are essentially non-ritual and non-hierarchical 
groupings which have now acquired strong political-cultural content and social-structural 
characteristics. Secondly because, for over last fifty to sixty years, a national economy 
and market have grown in India in the course of economic planning by the state. Lately 
with the freeing of markets from the state control, the process of structural delinking of the 
national economy from the caste economy—characterized by the jajmani system, 
hereditary occupations and local systems of food production and distribution—is now 
complete. At the national and regional levels castes have entered a new political 
economy of the modern nation–state. In this process, caste is fast loosing its identification 
in ritual status terms. Castes which functioned primarily as units of a vertical system of 
local hierarchies of ritual statuses have been transformed into larger social-cultural 
conglomerates and ethnic type formations, each representing commonality of political 
interest. These new formations occupy spaces at regional and national levels and cannot 
be identified in old caste-status terms. They will have to be identified in new social and 
political-cultural terms. I mean, they would make little sense if one attempts to identify or 
classify them in ritual hierarchical terms. This is why the survey researchers and the 
social analysts face unsurmountable problem [in fact they get into an irrelevant and 
infructious exercise] of codifying and classifying castes today in ritual hierarchy terms [as 
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‘upper’ ‘lower’ etc.]. In fact such expressions as ‘high castes’ and ‘low castes’ have lost 
meaning. This is why they are often prefixed with terms such as backward, forwards, non-
backward, dominant or poor, middle class and rich. 
 
Most interestingly the means, avenues and even aspirations for upward mobility in the 
society as well as the reasons for downward social mobility of individuals and groups 
have fundamentally changed with the collapse of the ritual hierarchy.  No one can rise or 
fall in status today `by adopting or discarding virtues of rituality or attributes of ritual 
status. For example, in the new stratificatory system, sanskrtization has lost relevance. 
People at the lower rungs of hierarchy no longer care to adopt Brahmanic or upper caste 
ritualistic behavior or symbols for upward mobility. Today they rather emulate the 
economic and consumerist life styles of the upper classes. This is because economic and 
political power, rather than the ritual status, is a surer means for upward mobility. With 
loss of economic power many an upper caste people have experienced downward 
mobility, despite their higher ritual status. In the caste system aspirations of different 
castes were conditioned and structured differently. Today people of all castes and 
communities have common aspirations and they are all related to economic (consumerist) 
life style. It is another matter that some can and some can’t realize these. But in this 
process, social mobility is increasingly becoming an individual pursuit than a collective 
group pursuit. Of course individuals use group- collective politics, but that as a means to 
individual end of achieving ‘higher’ status in the society. A large part of caste-politics is 
thus related to individual aspirations of the members of the lower castes to enter the 
middle class. This is why leaders of several lower castes pursuing upper class life styles 
are often blamed as deserters of the cause of their castes or as those who have been ‘co-
opted’ or ‘sold out’. One hears such complaints more frequently in respect of dalit and 
tribal elites pursuing improvements in their economic and social status.  
 
So you have today a stratificatory system in which the central category is the middle 
class. It is a new middle class and not the one of pre-independence period, which was a 
euphemism for a conglomerate of upper castes [the dwijas]. In reality also members of 
upper castes had almost exclusive access to modern education, professions and even 
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politics. Even as late as the mid 1960’s about 70 to 80 percent members of the higher civil 
services and the managers in public and private sector companies belonged to the upper 
castes. Today over 50 percent of the middle class according to the CSDS surveys come 
from the non-upper [the non-dwija] castes.  
 
Reformulating the theory of Caste: 
To conclude, the real failure of the structuralist/comparative theory of caste is its 
inability to recognize and make sense of categories of new stratification. Since 
the new categories  carry the tails of caste they are seen as extantions or 
reincarnations of the caste system. To put differently, the new forms of exclusion, 
because they conflate with caste, they do not make any sense to the 
conventional status theorist. This is perhaps because the new realities of social 
exclusion, do not easily fit the theory’s binary categories of data analysis such as 
caste versus equality and the traditional (South Asian) versus modern (Western) 
society, an extreme form of status disability, continuing from the past. They 
theory fails to recognize that status-disability of a caste is structurally linked to its 
collective-power deficiency, and that remedying exclusion is not (and really never 
was) primarily a (social) question of improving ritual status, e.g. through 
sanskritization. The issue of status mobility is, and has always been chiefly a 
political question, i.e., the one of redefining power-relations. 
In sum, the contemporary forms of social exclusion could be understood only if 
the conventional status theory is modified, expanded and transformed by taking 
account of insights generated by some recent (as well as some earlier ones 
neglected by the structuralists) theoretical and empirical-historical researches. I 
have in mind in contributions of Morton Klass, 1980, I.P. Desai 1988, Murray 
Milner 1994, Survira Jaiswal, 1998, Declan Quigley, 1999, Suzan Byley, 1999, 
Nicholas Dirks Hocart. These contributions enable us to view political power as a 
constitutive principle of caste, counteracting and constantly seeking to undermine 
its other principle, i.e., status. (Excaviting Hocart) 
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In light of the above I shall now formulate a political-theory definition of caste. 
 
Political Theoretical Definition of Caste 
By balancing the so far overemphasized principle of (ritual) status with that of 
(political) power, caste can be more concretely conceptualized, firstly, as the 
institution that has been structuring and maintaining, for centuries, relations of 
power among different communities. As such, it seeks to legitimize these power 
relations: (a) through systematically dispensing various mixes of economic and 
cultural assets/opportunities and deprivations to different communities and (b) 
through endowing religious/ideological sanctification of such dispensations. 
Secondly, being primarily a power system its sacralization and the elaborate 
mechanisms of rewards and punishments it evolved, did not and could not 
succeed in substantially and permanently incorporating or recasting the cultural 
and historical identities of different communities in terms of hierarchical relations.  
In sum, if we were to grasp the special nature of exclusion in India arising from a 
peculiar fusion of past processes of status-allocation and power-distribution and 
the contemporary process of modernity and democracy caste appears as a 
sacralized power structure—rather than an all-time, ideologically (religiously) 
determined hierarchy of ritual statuses. 
 
 
 
